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AbstrAct: Arguing against the grain of conventional readings that Rosenzweig’s 
philosophy is a-historical, I maintain instead that a more nuanced and faithful 
reading should take into account the underlying logical dynamics of his speech-
act philosophy that become embodied through the role that love relationships 
– understood aesthetically on both individual and communal levels – are ways to 
‘redeem’ history messianically, thereby redeeming or creating more just political 
communities. This happens at the level of an immanent, normative critique of 
the dominant authoritarian pressures to assimilate to existing social and political 
conditions. I connect that with a reading of Benjamin’s philosophy, arguing that 
Rosenzweig’s “messianic aesthetics” determinatively influenced Walter Benjamin’s 
dialectics of ethical and political critique – which resulted in Benjamin’s work 
becoming both revelatory and historically redemptive, that is, politically messianic.
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“Love and the origins of fascism” – such a strange pairing of terms, but in 
reflecting upon that towards which those terms respectively refer, such a pair-
ing challenges our habituated inclinations to simply and superficially reduce the 
terms to categorial antagonists in an ever-renewing, unending battle expressed 
through countless millennia in the forms and content of our poetry, our rules and 
regulations that govern commerce and social relations, and the national and inter-
national laws of our militarized States. It seems that we humans, as philosophers 
and artists, politicians and soldiers, slaves and dalits, women and men – all of us 
– have been seeking and continue to seek for the appropriate criteria for deter-
mining what is meaningful in our sensibly spiritual lives with each other and with 
this earth. With the following reflections, I hope to contribute some illuminating 
reflections on how the relationship of aesthetics and politics plays out in our ef-
forts to determine those criteria. My reflections are informed by the relationships 
of ethics to aesthetics set in motion for us in the philosophies of Franz Rosenzweig 
and Walter Benjamin.
At the beginning of Totality and Infinity, Emmanuel Levinas asks his readers 
if we “are not duped by morality” and in doing so raises the question of the dif-
ference between morality and ethics, with the inherent demand that we make the 
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effort to distinguish that difference1. The former, morality, refers to ideas that we 
have learned and hold about human behavior, through the epistemological and 
metaphysical language games that we play: rationalist forms of self-legislation or 
postulations of freedom; how to calculate the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number; or the cultivation of virtues and determinations of the mean between the 
extremes of deficiency and excess. Respectively, these are the well-known philo-
sophical theories of normative ethics: deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. 
But instead of continuing in the language games of morality, Levinas posits the 
claim that ‘ethics is first philosophy’ and that the definitional tasks of logic and 
metaphysics take subsidiary roles to the interpretive and phenomenological de-
scriptions of face-to-face encounters and inter-subjective relations. That entails a 
philosophy of experience that is relational and that begins by someone calling to 
another or by the other calling to me, which thereby establishes traditions and 
socio-cultural contexts and language. Those practices carry on that empirically 
unpredictable dynamic of call-and-response in environmental and material condi-
tions established at some specific time and place, having developed contingently 
and temporally out of our historically fixed past and with reference to an unknown 
and uncertain future. Most importantly, the call and response arises from an event 
that occurs in a community that is prior to all and every form of cognition and 
recognition; indeed, ethics as an activity takes form in the relational uncertainties 
and determinations of love or fascism, forms of which have come to be known and 
studied in the disciplines we call aesthetics and politics.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, two German-Jewish philosophers had 
a great deal to say about the nature of artistic expression, and a good bit about the 
political. Rosenzweig (1886-1929) and Benjamin (1892-1940) were contemporaries 
and even though they never met each other they had a philosophical kinship in 
the way that their respective religious and theological sensibilities interfused their 
aesthetic and literary theories with political considerations. Both philosophers 
were educated in the classical German tradition that included rigorous studies in 
classical and modern languages, literary studies, and economic and political theory. 
Both independently developed theories of language that were very similar2. But the 
1 The importance of this observation made by Levinas in the preface to Totality and Infinity is 
to contest the skepticism of other philosophers who believe that genuine peace and the kind of 
ethics (or morality), which it takes to achieve that, are not possible in the world. The only kind 
of ‘peace’ that is possible is that which can be founded on the negotiated exchanges of politics 
and submission to the dictates of “Real-Politik”. See E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity. An Essay 
on Exteriority (1969), Engl. transl. by A. Lingis, Dordrecht-Boston, Kluwer, 1991, p. 21.
2 The phrase “Es gibt nur eine Sprache” (“There is only one language”) is a central theme for 
Franz Rosenzweig’s philosophy of language that is fundamental for understanding the speech-
act logic in The Star of Redemption. See F. Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung (1921), in idem, 
Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften II, introduction by R. Mayer, Haag, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1976; Engl. transl. by W. W. Hallo, The Star of Redemption, Notre Dame, Notre Dame 
Press, 1985. The phrase also serves as a guiding thread for his theory of translation that asserts 
that all human languages are translational movements on variations of the search for “messianic 
peace” or, as I argue below, “messianic aesthetics”. See also F. Rosenzweig, Jehuda Halevi. Zwei-
undneunzig Hymnen und Gedichte, Berlin, Lambert Schneider, 1927, p. 155; Engl. transl. by T. 
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essential key to their kinship, however, was their existential condition of being 
Jewish which, in their case, meant that their works display a conscious awareness 
of the importance of being born into and having been influenced by a distinctive, 
culturally rich, and historically important religious community of people – in their 
case as Jews, a people who had developed their historical identity as exiles or 
strangers in strange lands. And as part of that identity, the historical and personal 
condition of exile that affected their ethical, political, and aesthetic sensibilities 
meant, for both Rosenzweig and Benjamin, that their aesthetic theories were 
charged with ethical forms of a responsibility that had significant consequences 
for how their political conditions affected their choices, personally and politically. 
This shows up in how Benjamin may have appropriated Rosenzweig’s highly 
complex aesthetics of the phenomenon of messianism – personally, historically, 
and politically. In what follows, I begin with the awareness of how messianism was 
not simply some arbitrary logical concept that was lying around, so speak, for these 
or others to pick up and stipulatively employ, but instead, should be understood as 
an historically embodied belief that has shaped minds and structured actions and 
communities in profound ways and continues to guide and inform the hopes and 
dreams of billions of humans as it has done for millennia3.
It was already the case that from the beginning of his studies as a student of 
philosophy and maturation into one of the twentieth century’s foremost critical 
thinkers, that Benjamin was self-consciously developing an ethically informed 
approach for his philosophy of art. Richard Wolin exhaustively spells this out 
in Walter Benjamin. An Aesthetic of Redemption, quoting Jürgen Habermas’s 
assessment of how Benjamin’s approach to art differed from that of Herbert 
Marcuse’s and Theodor Adorno’s4. Habermas separates the approaches by claiming 
that the latter two re-appropriated the Enlightenment agenda of liberating humans 
from the delusions of their ideologies, while Benjamin was committed to engaging 
in a redemptive critique. He notes that Benjamin’s criticism of art “aims, to be 
sure, at the ‘mortification of the works’; however, criticism [for Benjamin] effects 
a mortification of the work of art only in order to transpose it from the medium 
Kovach, E. Jospe, and G. G. Schmidt, Ninety-Two Poems and Hymns of Yehudah Halevi, ed. by 
R. A. Cohen, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2000, pp. XLV-XLVI.
3 For a provocative interpretation of the intertwined history of the phenomenon of messian-
ism, between Athens and Jerusalem, that affirms its ongoing contemporary relevance, especially 
from the perspective of the works of Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, Emil Fackenheim, 
and Emmanuel Levinas, see M. Kavka, Jewish Messianism and the History of Philosophy, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004. While the secondary literature on messianism, es-
pecially with respect to Judaism and Christianity, is too extensive to even begin to list here, 
I would like to note that the concept of “messianism” plays a role in many other religions as 
well: Islam, Buddhism (Maitreya), Hinduism (Kalki), Zoroastrianism (Saoshyant), and in the 
Bahá’í (Bahá’u’lláh). Even more relevant for this thesis is my publication on Walter Benjamin’s 
messianism: see J. Simon, Benjamin in Paris: Weak Messianism and Memories of the Oppressed, 
in Topographien der Erinnerung. Zu Walter Benjamins Passagen, ed. by B. Witte, Würzburg, 
Königshausen & Neumann, 2008, pp. 91-100.
4 See R. Wolin, Walter Benjamin. An Aesthetic of Redemption, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 
 University of California Press, 1994, p. 29.
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of beauty to the medium of truth – and thereby to redeem it”5. Wolin asserts 
that what is at issue for Benjamin was nothing less than developing a metaphysic 
of redemption whereby the “mortification” of the work of art becomes a way of 
putting something ascetically to death through religious purification – whereby 
the attentive singling out of an art-work as an autonomous, independent entity 
is accomplished by the work of the philosophical critic and mediated in such a 
way – through critique – that its truth content ‘bursts forth’ from its contingently 
‘dead’ historical-material conditions in order to reveal a kind of transcendent truth 
content and an ‘ideally’ redeemed life6.
The relevance of Wolin’s assessment has to do with that part of my thesis that 
depends on determining how Benjamin saw the role of the art critic as balancing 
the tension that holds between a serene and unattached aesthetic contemplation of 
great works of art – in the tradition of art for art’s sake – and the engaged socially 
concerned art that enters into the work of transforming the decadent and violently 
destructive socio-political modern age of technological reproducibility. On that 
point, Wolin notes that Benjamin was engaged in working on
[t]he distinction between “material content” and “truth content” [which] concerns 
the paradoxical fact that works of art are objects that originate in a determinate, 
fleeting moment of time but transcend that limited, historical point of origin in order 
to reveal something suprahistorical: an image of truth. The constantly fluctuating 
historical relation between these two moments accounts for the enigma of every work 
of art with which the critic always finds himself confronted initially: the Schein des 
Scheinlosen, the appearance of that which cannot appear, the emergence of something 
infinite, the truth, from something that is man-made and finite, a work of art7.
With respect to the work as a whole, Wolin situates Benjamin in the context 
of having been influenced by Ernst Bloch, György Lukács, and Bertolt Brecht – 
along with the usual friends, Theodor Adorno and Gershom Scholem – but with 
clear-sighted understanding that Benjamin’s unique roots sank deep into the fertile 
soil of his own, hard-won negation of Kant’s philosophical-epistemological project. 
On Benjamin’s reading, that philosophical project was a ‘watershed event’ that led 
to skeptically dividing humans up into isolated subjects and simultaneously insti-
tutionalized ‘science’ into distinct, isolated disciplines of knowledge – narrowing 
the scope of acceptable theoretical discourse with the deluded belief that all true 
knowledge is empirically measurable knowledge. The larger metaphysical or phe-
nomenological or ‘life’ issue for Benjamin, and before him for Rosenzweig, is that 
5 Ibidem.
6 Wolin develops the thesis of “mortification” even further in his chapter “The Path to Trau-
erspiel”, where he explicates Benjamin’s criticisms of Kant’s “Enlightenment biases […] [that] 
[…] conspire to produce a concept of experience that remains hostage to the scientistic preju-
dices of his age”. See ibidem, p. 34, and pp. 52 f. for references to how the goal of all art criticism 
is the mortification of the transitory, material content of works of art to enable them to “bask in 
the eternal light of truth”.
7 Ibidem, p. 30.
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such a reduction of reason to the role of handmaiden to the natural sciences and the 
resultant categorical ban on all utopian or idealist thinking, reduced ‘experience’ to 
the domain of narrowly – arguably myopically – determined axiomatic judgments 
of purely rational postulations, only verifiable in their respective, schematically con-
figured knowledge cells. This is all well and good but mostly provocative. Which is 
why it also provides an entry point for my thesis about aesthetics and politics.
My thesis is motivated by my contention that Wolin left out one of the most 
important influences on Benjamin’s thought and work, namely, Benjamin’s reading 
of Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption. Wolin does include a significant reference 
to Rosenzweig in a footnote which indicates that in Benjamin’s Trauerspiel work, 
the “idea of ‘speechlessness’ of the tragic hero once he has realized himself to be 
superior to the gods derives from Franz Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption”8. 
However, while that is a significant concession, it does not go nearly far enough. 
I have been pointing towards the critical importance of aligning Benjamin’s and 
Rosenzweig’s work for many years, at least as far back as my article in “Philosophy 
Today”, Benjamin’s Feast of Booths from 2003, where I make the argument that 
“Rosenzweig embraces the life of a subversive messianic exile that enables the 
structures of distance that are needed for ethical critique of any political system, 
precisely because of the self-differentiation involved in creating and maintaining 
the integrity of a Jewish community”9. I go on to argue that Benjamin may well 
have modeled his Convolute  I in the Passagen-Werk from being inspired by his 
reading of Rosenzweig10. Central to that thesis is the understanding of the central-
ity of the revelatory love relationship both in Rosenzweig’s masterpiece, The Star 
of Redemption, and for his general understanding of the ‘aesthetics’ of messianism 
and how that aesthetic differentially works in our modern human lives and rela-
tionships, as such.
More than ten years before I began thinking about their relationship, however, 
Stéphane Mosès drew our attention to the significance of Benjamin’s reading 
of Rosenzweig in his work, The Angel of History. Mosès makes the case that 
“Rosenzweig countered modern nationalism, which he interprets as a secularized 
form of messianism, with the concept of a metahistory, that is, a sacred time, cut 
off from the vicissitudes of political temporality, where the Jewish people would 
live its religious vocation”11. Mosès also argues that Benjamin rethought Marxist 
themes and historical materialism in the light of Jewish messianism as he “once 
and for all rejects all notions of historical progress by countering it with the idea of 
8 Ibidem, p. 283, note 55.
9 J. Simon, Benjamin’s Feast of Booths, in “Philosophy Today”, XLVII (2003), no. 3, pp. 258-265, 
here p. 259.
10 The Passagen-Werk refers to Benjamin’s massive, unfinished project on developing a 
philosophy of the city, based on his observations about Paris. See W. Benjamin, The Arcades 
Project (1982), Engl. transl. by H. Eiland and K. McLaughlin, prepared on the basis of the 
German volume ed. by R. Tiedemann, Cambridge-London, The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2002.
11 See S. Mosès, The Angel of History. Rosenzweig, Benjamin, Scholem (1992), Engl. transl. 
by B. Harshav, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 14.
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the sudden interruptions of history: breaks that are so many messianic instants”12. 
In his analysis, Mosès lays out the terms for his thesis by drawing attention to 
the exchange of letters by Rosenzweig and Eugen Rosenstock which occurred 
along the lines of a discussion of the historical development of the Jewish and 
Christian peoples and the changes that occurred in modernity, specifically in how 
they contended with each other about what it means to be chosen, to be elected 
– to be ‘messianic’, as it were. As Mosès correctly noted, the historical reality 
that Rosenzweig identified to develop his part of the argument depended on his 
understanding of the “purely political vision [that] has governed the national 
consciousness of all European nations since 1789”13. That consciousness begins 
with revolutionary France coming to believe that it had a universal mission to 
spread the idea of freedom throughout the world and continued with Hegel 
systematically taking up Fichte’s belief that Germany was the new chosen people 
by showing that all great civilizations in the world had, in their particular times 
and places, their role to play in the universal mission to embody and progressively 
move forward the dialectical realization of the Absolute Spirit. In carrying 
on his critique of Hegel from Hegel and the State into The Star of Redemption, 
Rosenzweig notes that universalizing messianism into a philosophy of the State 
by Hegel led to the proliferation of the competing sovereignties of the modern 
nation-states, based on the thinking that “all peoples are chosen peoples, and all 
modern wars are holy wars”14. Rosenzweig’s project in The Star of Redemption, as 
we have come to increasingly know its contours and complexities, was to provide 
an alternate version of world history, one that was redemption-oriented and that 
held on to the ideals of love-as-ethicality such that what it means to be responsible 
is to never completely merge with the societies in which one participates, but to 
maintain an ethical, exilic, and non-assimilative distance. Only in this way could 
the Jews, in their quintessential humanity, remain true to themselves and to each 
other. Rosenzweig identified this as a messianic nationalism with eschatological 
ideologies that would proliferate into various national models with universal 
pretensions15. The concomitant corollary to this, which Mosès alludes to, is 
that with such developments the element of critical, ethical distance would be 
suppressed in the emergence of the form of political fascism.
The best way to understand this, however, is to turn to the work of Benjamin 
who intentionally misreads Rosenzweig’s passages on love, the lover, and the 
beloved – and what it means to be chosen16. But before considering Benjamin’s 
12 Ibidem.
13 Ibidem, p. 45.
14 Ibidem, p. 28. This is a theme that Rosenzweig was able to authoritatively develop because 
of his Hegel book. See: F. Rosenzweig, Hegel und der Staat, 2 vols., München-Berlin, R. Olden-
bourg, 1920.
15 S. Mosès, op. cit., p. 45.
16 As the core thesis for this paper, “Benjamin’s misreading of Rosenzweig” is spelled out 
in the following pages and most directly by page 144, with the declaration: “This is Benjamin’s 
modification of Rosenzweig’s ‘messianic aesthetics’” and in what follows in the next paragraph 
with respect to how Benjamin modifies Rosenzweig’s midrash on Shir ha-Sharim: “Benjamin 
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misreading, it is necessary to carefully consider those passages that constitute the 
heartpiece of The Star of Redemption in Book 2 of Part II and how Rosenzweig’s 
philosophy of art can be interpreted as expressing human relationships that are 
ethically inflected. To do that effectively enough to be able to grasp Benjamin’s 
misreading, however, we would need to understand Rosenzweig’s theory of art and 
aesthetics in such a way that we could likewise grasp the role that ethicality plays 
in his work. That is the work that I did in my book, Art and Responsibility. A Phe-
nomenology of the Diverging Paths of Rosenzweig and Heidegger17. Recounting the 
thesis and arguments I make there is too much to recapitulate here but constitute 
the grounds for my contentions in the thesis that I am proposing here. Instead of 
that detailed argument, in what follows, I briefly interpret several aspects of Ben-
jamin’s indebtedness to Rosenzweig’s aesthetics which provided material for his 
own, original analysis of the aestheticizing of politics in the early twentieth century.
Significantly, one of the defining influences on the development of Benjamin’s 
approach to understanding the relationship of politics and aesthetics came from 
his encounter with Rosenzweig’s philosophy; specifically, his reading of the first 
two parts of The Star of Redemption. As I noted above, it was already the case 
before Benjamin came to The Star that he had the sense that his distinctive con-
tribution to our human development and relations would be as a literary critic, 
in the grandest sense of what that vocation entails. But that calling changed, not 
only under the influence of Bloch, Brecht, and Lukács, but of his love relationship 
with Asja Lācis18 and his reading of Rosenzweig. What may have emerged from his 
reading was his intuition of the way in which Rosenzweig develops the concept of 
a “messianic aesthetics” throughout the course of his book and the way in which 
that concept constitutes the ethical heart of Rosenzweig’s own ethically informed 
philosophy of art19. In what follows, I provide a brief overview of that concept and 
then a few ideas about what that may have meant for Benjamin.
In Part  I of The Star of Redemption, Rosenzweig develops the foundations 
for what he would later characterize as his “New Thinking”, namely, a way of 
thinking that challenges traditional forms of ‘totalizing’ thinking that he identified 
with philosophical idealism, from “Iona to Jena” – from Plato’s idealist philosophy 
through Hegel’s idealist philosophy. From Rosenzweig’s perspective, the ways 
in which humans are philosophically and culturally taught to think about their 
relationship with the world and other humans in developing human communities 
responds midrashically in taking up Rosenzweig’s handling of the biblical passages of what it 
means to be chosen in love”.
17 See J. Simon, Art and Responsibility. A Phenomenology of the Diverging Paths of Rosenzweig 
and Heidegger, New York-London, Continuum, 2011.
18 See W. Benjamin, One-Way Street (1928), Engl. transl. by E. Jephcott, ed. by M. W. Jen-
nings, preface by G. Marcus, Cambridge-London, The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2016.
19 For a more detailed elaboration of the concept of “messianic aesthetics”, see my article 
Rosenzweig’s Messianic Aesthetics, in Franz Rosenzweigs “neues Denken”. Internationaler Kon-
greß Kassel 2004, ed. by W. Schmied-Kowarzik, 2 vols., Freiburg-München, Karl Alber, 2006, 
vol. 1, pp. 407-417.
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came about, principally, through combining and interweaving cultural and 
linguistic traditions that have historically resulted in the formation of distinct types 
of ethical, and thus political communities. The task of the artist in such a world has 
been a very important one because, for Rosenzweig, artists are essential in human 
communities for how they provide diverse ways for other humans to transform 
themselves, their experiences, and their relationships, through the particular ways 
that they both ‘critically’ and ‘lovingly’ engage with their respective socio-political 
and earthly environments. This is especially the case with poetry and the spoken 
and performative arts, but not exclusively, since Rosenzweig also considers 
the religious rituals of liturgy and various kinds of architecture associated with 
religious communities – such as churches – as kinds of art forms. Rosenzweig 
based his philosophy of art on how he thought of the role of the artist as one that 
affirms the fragmented and particularistic nature of human experience, especially 
in the development of authentic and transformative forms of love relationships. It 
is, thereby, also a relationship of responsibility.
Rosenzweig develops his “messianic aesthetics” through synthesizing several 
levels of philosophical interpretations and analyses – existentially, metaphysically, 
epistemologically, and most importantly ethically and aesthetically. The con-
sequences for political critique are not directly addressed because his approach, 
like Benjamin’s, cultivates indirection and thus establishes the horizons for ef-
fectively criticizing political totalitarianism and fascism. For Rosenzweig, this is 
done through the theological lens of messianism primarily because the monotheistic 
religious traditions upon which he focuses – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – 
promote messianic ways of thinking through aesthetically informing various ways 
of developing and promoting community relations. This can be seen in how such 
traditions have historically developed, that is: through their relatively similar forms 
of foundational scriptures; through distinct expressions of poetry, narrative and 
hermeneutic practices; through architecture – synagogues, churches, and mosques; 
and through liturgical rituals. More specifically for Rosenzweig, the particularity of 
the historical development of religious communities can be further differentiated 
by the ways in which those communities respectively have adopted different 
forms of messianic aesthetics. What I mean by that is that Judaism, for example, 
has developed a distinct form of a messianic aesthetic that has determined the 
shape and practices of that community as an exilic, non-assimilative community in 
changing political contexts over more than two thousand years. As Mosès points 
out in his analysis of the Rosenzweig-Rosenstock exchange, those notions of Jewish 
and Christian assimilation or non-assimilation to the political world order critically 
determined Rosenzweig’s New Thinking. For me, that New Thinking can be 
otherwise characterized as an expression of his messianic aesthetics.
We can see how that works by turning to The Star of Redemption. In Part II of 
the book, Rosenzweig fleshes out a formal aesthetic theory that he outlined in Part I 
by elaborating how that aesthetic theory concretely functions with the midrash (a 
Jewish form of interpretation) that he presents on the pagan love song, Shir ha-
Sharim, the Song of Songs – which serves as the heartpiece for both his book and 
– for Rosenzweig – for the Hebrew Bible, the Tanakh. Rosenzweig uses a midrash 
Filosofia     aEsthEtics and Politics: rEFlEctions on lovE and thE origins oF Fascism 141
of the Song of Songs in order to provide a concrete application of how the art form 
of poetry can be used to express the dynamics and particular material conditions of 
human love relationships. Moreover, he does so to exemplify ethical considerations, 
namely, how a work of art can be used to preserve and promote responsible activity 
of humans towards each other. In so far as someone participates in such forms of 
authentic artistic expression – forms of authentic, dialogically responsive love – she 
is able not only to grow in her own abilities to be more ethically and aesthetically 
responsive to the world within which we live, but she is also able to engage with 
others (beyond her lover) in more responsive and responsible ways by not only 
respecting their differences but in loving them because of the attraction of those 
differences. In fact, Rosenzweig felt so strongly about this that he said: “In order 
for a human to become most fully human, he has to write [and share] a poem of 
love at least one time in his life”. When art happens, especially poetry, we become 
aware of and involved in the unpredictable and revelatory joys of love relations, of 
being chosen and of choosing another with whom to be happy and healthy together.
The paper that I published ten years ago at the “founding” Congress of the 
Internationale Rosenzweig-Gesellschaft e.V. in Kassel, Germany, is entitled Rosen-
zweig’s Messianic Aesthetics. At the time, I used ideas from Benjamin’s philosophy 
to help make sense of the messianic ‘function’ in Rosenzweig’s aesthetic theory. 
Also at the time, I focused on the speech-act phenomena laid out by Rosenzweig in 
his discussion of love relationships as revelatory and the source of responsibility in 
Part II of The Star of Redemption. In that regard, I want to briefly reconsider that 
earlier work and revisit some of what I said then because while I think that my in-
terpretations of Rosenzweig were spot-on, I believe I did a disservice to Benjamin. 
In looking back, I will then be looking forward because one of those new horizons 
that has opened with the most recent work dealing with Rosenzweig’s philosophy 
is the way in which his philosophy can be effectively applied. In my previous inter-
pretation, as I used my understanding of Benjamin to help interpret Rosenzweig 
then, Rosenzweig’s work is now beginning to be conjoined with that of others, 
helping to further develop a body of research inspired by the seminal originality 
of Rosenzweig’s work. That, after all, is also the essential function of midrash and 
that little word and.
The passage in question comes after my analysis of how Rosenzweig differenti-
ates the two forms of “content” – Gehalt and Inhalt – in his three-part elaboration 
of his aesthetic theory in The Star of Redemption – outer form, inner form, and the 
Beautiful – and how that relates to what he presents about the phenomenon of 
love and the theological/aesthetic concept of “revelation” in Part II, Book 2. This 
is that passage20:
In Rosenzweig’s formal aesthetic categories, the concept of revelation (Offenbarung) 
has less to do with grounding or explaining the elements as ‘stuff’ than with typifying 
how humans-as-elements relate. In other words, Rosenzweig’s choice, like Levinas’ 
after him, is to prioritize ethics over ontology, which means that in his aesthetics he 
20 Ibidem, pp. 415 f.
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establishes the grounds of an epistemology that is derived from an already established 
ethical relationship […]. Indeed, the aesthetic categories themselves, as revelatory-
relational concepts, have to do not with breadth of “content”, defined as Inhalt, which 
would have to do with creation, but rather with the evaluative intensity of content 
defined as Gehalt21. While Inhalt connotes that which is contained in something else, 
as liquid is contained in a vessel, Gehalt connotes that which is earned, experienced, 
and held – and entails a temporal association. Hence, to denote such evaluative-
intensive kinds of “content”, Rosenzweig refers to revelation as a temporal/aesthetic 
process of sensual en-souling22. Unlike the process of creation, the revelatory process 
of ensouling is depicted not as a “setting-free-from” but, rather, as that which takes 
the form of a wrestling-out-of the pre-aesthetic wholeness.
And the relevant passage about Benjamin is in the following paragraph23:
any lover who turns out of and away from her or himself and attends to the other 
prioritizes that other, thus ‘ensouling’ the other with an intensity of value, of ‘holding’ 
or ‘embracing’ the other in consideration – along the lines of a Benjaminian auratic 
relationship. But for Rosenzweig, this is not merely a subject-object, dialectical 
process with a happy and mutually beneficial ‘return’ function; rather, it is one in 
which both subjects (lover and beloved) stand in immediate relation to the whole of 
their cohering relationship, just differently, and alternating the embracing and thus 
enlivening acts for and with each other24. What was previously mere stuff or content as 
Inhalt becomes, through the embrace of each one of the other, ensouled content with 
particular value as Gehalt. The revelatory process is a way of talking about how those 
involved in relating to one another from their respectively isolated and relatively 
differentiated status as individually created object-things experience irruption and 
undergo conversion into a differentiating process of particular subjects endowed with 
value – so endowed because each is loved/named/identified in and for her/himself – 
uniquely and historically attended to, that is, messianically chosen25.
The key lines are the movement from conceptual vision to embodied wholeness 
that only can come about through being engaged in the ‘ensouling’ of a love rela-
tionship. In making sense of this “messianic aesthetic” of love for Rosenzweig, my 
insight at the time was to use Benjamin’s more famous presentation of the aesthetic 
21 F. Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung, cit., p. 213. The entire quote is: “des Ganzen auf 
den zu ver-dichtenden seelischen Gehalt”. Inhalt connotes that which is contained in something 
else, as liquid is contained in a vessel, for example. Whereas, Gehalt connotes that which is 
earned, experienced, and held.
22 Ibidem, pp. 213 ff., for further elaboration on how Inhalt is distinguished from Gehalt. 
At the end, Rosenzweig depicts the star of redemption whose “content of Judaism” (Gehalt des 
Judentums) flames forth with the truth of the oneness of God. See ibidem, p. 457.
23 J. Simon, Rosenzweig’s Messianic Aesthetics, cit., pp. 416 f.
24 As an aside, note the respective emergence of the “Yes” and “No” from the nothing in the 
section on metaphysics in Book 1, Part I of The Star of Redemption for Rosenzweig’s presentation 
of an analysis of the logic of “wrestled out conceptual meaning”. This is a re-soundence of that pro-
cess on another, more complex, level. In terms of chaos theory, the application can be compared 
to that of a scaling of structures of similarity. The success of Rosenzweig’s project depends in no 
small measure on the way these anti-dialectical structures permeate, that is, scale through his text.
25 Through listening to and responding to the other’s story.
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concept of “aura” as a way to unpack, as it were, Rosenzweig’s presentation of the 
phenomenon of love. However, in these past several years in working more closely 
with Benjamin’s work, I have come to better understand what I take to be his deep 
indebtedness to what he learned from reading Rosenzweig as informing his own 
understanding of the experience of aura in the aesthetically expressive acts of art 
and the phenomenon of experiencing the ‘aura’ of another person, a work of art, 
or simply any ‘thing’ whatsoever.
This way of relating the phenomena of art and the ethics of responsibility was 
most likely integrated into Benjamin’s way of thinking after he read Rosenzweig’s 
The Star of Redemption in the late 1920s. For Benjamin, however, the responsibility 
of an artist and of the art critic extends to their respective awareness of the ways in 
which art is employed to address the present condition of capitalism and the ex-
ploitation and suffering of the masses. In his most anthologized essay, The Work of 
Art in the Age of Technological Reproducibility, Benjamin wrote that it is possible to 
formulate “theses about the developmental tendencies of art under present condi-
tions of production” but that these theses (on art) would “brush aside a number of 
outmoded concepts, such as creativity and genius, eternal value and mystery” and 
introduce new ones “useful for the formulation of revolutionary demands in the 
politics of art”26. Where Rosenzweig developed his aesthetic theory on art through 
linking it to dialogical modes of creativity and ethical responsibility, Benjamin chal-
lenged authoritarian forms of political habit and traditions, especially in how those 
developed into monological forms of totalitarian fascism in Germany and through-
out Europe. Underlying Benjamin’s critique is Rosenzweig’s insight about love and 
creativity. And, correlatively, Benjamin’s challenge could easily be understood as the 
extension of Rosenzweig’s modern, nationalist secular messianism.
From Rosenzweig, however, it seems to me that Benjamin also adopted the 
notion that art should promote a personal way of ‘aesthetically’ living in one’s 
present with loving attention and actively engaging one’s memory, both voluntary 
and involuntary forms. For both Rosenzweig and Benjamin, both artist and 
she who is engaged in experiencing art attend to the relationship of particular 
to whole, of the relationship of individual in the context of the whole work and 
of its social expression, and thus preserve the participatory aesthetic activity of 
humans in how we have trained ourselves to manipulate or to be manipulated, to 
consciously adopt or unconsciously apply ideas to the point of abstraction that 
can result in indifference. Instead, Benjamin uses the art of montage because of 
the way that particular art-form retains a more authentic way that humans relate 
to each other in our daily, fragmented and relative ways. Instead of reproducing 
‘correct’ forms of regulated behavior, montage can be found in fragmented 
forms of narrative, gatherings of related-but-distinct quotations, and in radically 
26 W. Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility (1936), Engl. 
transl. by E. Jephcott and H. Zohn, in idem, Selected Writings, vol. 3, 1935-1938, ed. by H. Ei-
land and M. W. Jennings, Cambridge-London, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2002, pp. 101-133, here p. 101.
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particular expressions of individual experiences. In fact, Benjamin’s short text, 
One-Way Street, is his successful depicting of literary montage.
For Benjamin, but also for Rosenzweig, this relates to the aesthetics of German 
idealism, especially Kant’s, where participatory art promotes responsibility and 
which is supposed to then ‘heal’ the problems of the non-aesthetic realm. For Kant, 
that meant learning about what is beautiful and sublime which leads individual, 
rational agents to form a communis sensus guided by their common understanding 
of the duty of a universally legislating moral imperative. With that in mind, 
namely, the teaching of art as Bildung (an education in culture), someone like the 
neo-Kantian Friedrich Schiller could argue that being educated in art enables us 
to better seek to create a higher realm of ideas/experience and thus to come to a 
more whole, or ‘total’ experience.
However, Benjamin’s critique is that such a ‘wholeness’ in art can only be pro-
visional and thus has to be presented in more fragmented ways – via montage – in 
order to retain an openness to the uniqueness of human expression and individual-
ity. Thus, ‘authentic’ forms of art should present experiences indirectly and thereby 
as resistance to or negation of a totalizing, fascist political world. What this means, 
is that one of the functions of ‘good’ or authentic art is to create shock and renewal 
in such a way that a process of judging of the world begins to occur. In such a judg-
ing, things get destroyed – mortified, as Habermas put it – but because the things 
themselves are signifiers, or metaphors, or allegories, they refer to something else 
and thus preserve, as it were, a more authentic ‘higher’ or sanctified realm of total-
ity. This is Benjamin’s modification of Rosenzweig’s “messianic aesthetics”, which 
takes the dialectical form of destroying the political aesthetics of a profane world 
of ‘symbols’ that can be mimetically reproduced and thus easily represented to 
manipulate the consciousness of the masses – thus mobilizing them for violent 
purposes. Benjamin’s aesthetics are dialectical because, as dialectical judgments of 
art, they occur in part and thus indirectly entail a minimal conscious awareness of 
and engagement with one’s socio-political world through negation – thus allowing 
for the preservation of and provision for a higher ‘messianic’ or sanctified life of 
truly auratic experiences of genuine human expression. Indeed, if I am interpret-
ing Benjamin’s dialectical aesthetics ‘correctly,’ such judgments lead us towards ac-
tually transforming our social relations, which is the essence of a ‘genuinely loving’ 
messianic aesthetic and not the fascist form of a messianic aesthetic.
This means returning to consider in what ways Benjamin intentionally misreads 
Rosenzweig’s midrash on the Song of Songs, which is the core expression of Rosen-
zweig’s messianic aesthetics. Benjamin responds midrashically in taking up Rosen-
zweig’s handling of the biblical passages of what it means to be chosen in love, 
that is, chosen in a play of both responsibility and sexually embodied attraction 
for each other. Rosenzweig refers to his aesthetic as an expression of the sinnlich/
übersinnlich nature of our human relations and as part of his absolute empiricism 
and thus more than analogy. It is in such a context, that Rosenzweig’s passages 
on the Song of Songs should be read, as midrash on the biblical affirmation of the 
sanctity, the truth, the goodness, and the beauty of love – of love that contends 
with and conquers death through its power of transforming social relations. On 
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the one hand, there are the simple affirmations of each other, as others, that are 
expressed from lover to beloved and beloved to lover that happen in acts of loving. 
These acts are transposed through artistic and philosophical expressions and in 
communal narratives, in strange lands and at different moments of the day and in 
ritual and non-ritual ways, open to welcoming strangers in genuine acts of love of 
family and of one’s unexpected and even perhaps unwelcome neighbors. But that 
is just it. How does one affirm love of one’s neighbor in one breath but in the next 
judge that their actions are such that I should resist them, that I should maintain 
critical distance? And that my aesthetic expressions in and of themselves should 
also voice this negation and resistance? Benjamin felt compelled to preserve and 
yet to negate and in his case, cultivates aesthetic expressions and forms of art that 
allow for the preservation of the auratic element of love – the experience of gazing 
at someone or something and experiencing the joy of their returning my gaze also 
in loving attention and care – precisely in the absence that is created in genuine 
critique and engagement with that in the other that causes pain and suffering and 
which does not support happy and healthy and authentic communal relations that 
affirm the least amongst us.
